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 ■ The COVID-19 crisis has disrupted the food systems and rural livelihoods of the households surveyed 
for this study. This has coincided with an economic meltdown characterised by rising debt, a weak 
currency and growing inflation.
 ■ Most households reported a reduction in movements both within and outside their own village 
between October 2020 and March 2021.
 ■ Many households reported school children (both girls and boys) doing more housework and farm 
work during the closure of schools due to COVID-19.
 ■ Most households received emergency support from the government, while support from family and 
friends, local religious organisations, local village organisations and other external organisations 
remained insignificant throughout the pandemic.
 ■ Households reporting reductions in their participation in both farming and business activities 
increased October 2020 and March 2021.
 ■ The number of households reporting an ability to access work within their village was significantly 
higher than the number able to access work outside of their village. While, the proportion of 
households accessing work outside of their village increased slightly over time, it still remained below 
the number accessing work inside their village.
 ■ The ability of households to hire farm labour to continue farming activities remained high between 
October 2020 and March 2021, but the cost of labour also rose.
 ■ Most households reported a reduction in their ability to sell various commodities at the farm-gate and 
in local, district, national and cross-border markets in October 2020, but access had improved by 
March 2021.
 ■ Households reporting a reduction of the number of buyers or brokers coming to their village to buy 
farm produce remained high, but reduced slightly by 6% points by March 2021 compared to October 
2020.
 ■ While about half of households reported a decrease in the availability of all services for agricultural 
production in October 2020, availability had improved by March 2021 except for contractual 
arrangements for cash crops and concessionary loans whose availability continued to decrease. 
Prices for farm inputs, tillage services, and rental of agricultural land were reported to have increased 
with the onset of COVID-19 by most households and the proportion reporting an increase continued 
to rise, except for farm inputs. 
 ■ Households falling in a ‘high food insecurity’ status reduced from about half of surveyed households 
in October 2020 to about a third by March 2021, while the proportion falling in the ‘low food 
insecurity’ category increased between the two time periods.
 ■ Households reporting an ability to take full control of their lives reduced significantly from nearly half 
of the respondents before the onset of the pandemic to less than one fifth during October 2020, but 




1.1 The shock of COVID-19 and the state 
response
COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) in March 2020 (Haider et 
al., 2020). The speed with which the pandemic spread 
geographically, and the high rate of mortality of its 
victims (initially in high and middle-income countries), 
prompted many countries around the world to institute 
‘lockdowns’ of various sorts to contain it (Carmody 
and McCann, 2020; Haider et al, 2020). Globally, the 
policy guidelines on containment of COVID-19, while 
similar, have been applied by individual countries with 
different levels of intensity in line with the evolution of 
the pandemic nationally. The measures include: stay-
at-home orders; frequent washing of hands or use of 
alcohol-based hand sanitisers; physical distancing; use 
of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as face 
masks; restrictions of or limitations to, the number of 
people attending public gatherings; closure of borders; 
curfews; travel bans; and total or partial lockdowns 
(Olayide, 2020; WHO, 2020).
While the global concern in the early months following 
the emergence of COVID-19 was with health impacts, 
the ‘lockdown’ measures put in place by governments 
triggered global socioeconomic shocks as economies 
entered recessions due to disruption of economic 
activity that the ‘lockdown’ measures entailed. Data 
suggests that the socioeconomic shocks arising 
from ‘lockdowns’ have been more severe in sub-
Saharan Africa countries, generating dire livelihood 
consequences for most citizens who depend on the 
informal economy for survival, that these will likely take 
decades to recover from, and that the implications for 
human life experience will be generational (Carmody 
and McCann, 2020; McCann and Matenga, 2020). 
Some studies also indicate that the extent of harm 
caused by the ‘lockdowns’ will be a function of many 
factors, including the breadth, depth and length of the 
measures put in place by governments, the state of 
the economy preceding the emergence of COVID-19, 
and levels of fear about the Coronavirus in respective 
countries (Haider et al., 2020: 7).
Zambia identified its first COVID-19 case on 18 March 
2020. Before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the Zambian economy was projected to experience 
negative growth in 2020, dropping by at least 2.6%. 
The country’s poor economic performance was 
triggered by a severe drought in 2018 and, together 
with declining mining activity, resulted in the gross 
domestic product dropping from 4% in 2018 to 1.5% 
in 2019 (AGRA, 2020). The impact of this drought 
on agricultural and hydroelectricity production, and 
a fall in copper prices due to reduced demand as a 
result of COVID-19, has led to a downward spiral of 
Zambia’s economy. This, together with rising debt due 
to government over-borrowing has caused a severe 
economic crisis (ibid). The national currency, the 
Zambian Kwacha, has been depreciating over the last 
few years, and by one estimate had been depreciating 
by about 50% on a yearly basis by October 2020 (FAO, 
2020). From the foregoing, it is clear that the impacts 
of COVID-19 and an economy under pressure are self-
reinforcing.
In anticipation of the outbreak of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the government took proactive steps by 
constituting a multi-sectoral COVID-19 response team, 
approving a COVID-19 Contingency and Response 
Plan and a budget on 13 March 2020 (AGRA, 2020), 
and gazetted the orders/guidelines to manage the 
spread of the pandemic. The measures included: 
frequent washing of hands or use of alcohol-based 
hand sanitisers; social distancing; use of face masks 
in public; closure of borders and international travel 
bans; and banning of public gatherings and/or limiting 
the number of people in attendance. All learning 
institutions were closed and selected businesses 
were restricted (Haider et al, 2020; GRZ, 2020). 
Furthermore, government authorities made stay-at-
home appeals and undertook partial lockdowns in 
targeted geographic areas (see Section 3 for a detailed 
elaboration on COVID-19 related measures instituted 
by the Zambian Government). 
The two months following the first confirmed case of 
COVID-19 were characterised by a slow spread, and 
cases remained relatively low officially. For instance, on 
15 April 2020, the country reported three new confirmed 
cases but recorded no deaths, bringing the national 
case tally to 48 and two deaths (ZNPHI, 2020a). By 
15 May 2020 there were 14 new cases and no deaths, 
raising the total confirmed cases to 668 and seven 
deaths (ZNPHI, 2020b). However, it is instructive to note 
that the relatively low number of cases was most likely 
a result of low rates of testing due to inadequate testing 
kits and a lack of capacity to account for COVID-19 
deaths. Uncertainty surrounding COVID-19 and the low 
numbers of confirmed cases and low death rates at the 
time prompted a national debate as to whether it was 
the health of the people or the economy and livelihoods 
that the government should care about, as it weighed 
different options in dealing with the pandemic. There 
were calls for a total lockdown from a cross-section 
of people, including opposition political parties when 
cases began escalating. The government, however, 
5
refused to impose a total lockdown claiming that that 
would have a worse outcome than COVID-19 itself. The 
government argued that a total lockdown would result 
in severe livelihood consequences given the high levels 
of dependence on the informal economy for survival 
by the majority of the population (Mvula, 2020). The 
government, therefore, kept essential businesses 
dealing with goods and services open, and this 
included all shops, supermarkets and food markets. 
The government opted for “a phased strategy that will 
take into consideration interventions for the low and 
high income groups, low and high density areas, rural 
and urban areas” (GRZ, 2020). 
When some COVID-19 measures began to be lifted in 
May  2020, Zambia experienced an exponential growth 
in COVID-19 cases particularly during the month of July. 
COVID-19 confirmed cases rose from 1,632 on 6 July to 
4,481 on 26 July (OCHA, 2020a). This increase forced 
Parliament to adjourn, particularly after two Members 
of Parliament also died after contracting it. By 29 
October 2020, the country had reported 16,325 cases 
and 348 deaths (OCHA, 2020b), and this signalled 
the start of what was characterised as a ‘second 
COVID-19 wave’. As of 23 February 2021 the second 
wave had peaked, and the country had recorded 
75,582 cases and 1,040 deaths (ZNPHI, 2021a). Cases 
began to abate between March and April 2021 but 
then rise again in May 2021 with a warning that a third 
wave was imminent. The month of June 2021 can be 
described as the COVID-19 ‘apocalypse’ for Zambia as 
the rise in cases and deaths was unprecedented. On 
20 June 2021, the country recorded 2,060 new cases 
and 49 deaths in the preceding 24 hours, bringing the 
cumulative confirmed cases to 129,033 and cumulative 
deaths to 1,644 (ZNPHI, 2021b).
1.2 Structure of the paper
This paper is as divided into seven sections. Section 
One is an introduction of the study and gives the 
context in relation to the shock of COVID-19 at the 
global level and then the national level and state 
responses. Section Two highlights the objectives 
of the study and the research strategy. Section 
Three discusses the research results in relation to 
COVID-19 symptoms at household, village or district 
levels, and respondents’ access to health care 
during the pandemic. The section further highlights 
COVID-19 measures put in place and controls on 
movements. Section Three discusses the burden of 
care responsibilities at home by school children during 
the closure of schools. It further presents findings on 
1  A farm block is a large agricultural area where infrastructure such as feeder roads, electricity, water for irrigation and domestic 
uses, and communication facilities are provided by the government to stimulate sustainable partnerships with private sector 
investors.
assistance measures received by communities in the 
study areas during the pandemic period. Section Four 
presents study results on the impacts of COVID-19 on 
agricultural production activities, including small-scale 
farmer participation in farming, access to work within 
and outside villages, and the ability of farmers to hire 
labour. The section further discusses the ability of 
households to sell farm commodities in different types 
of markets and transport commodities to points of 
sale, and the extent to which buyers or brokers came 
to the villages to buy farm produce. The section then 
discusses the impact of COVID-19 on the availability 
of various services for agricultural production and their 
cost. Section Five reveals the availability of different 
food types and their costs. Using the Food Insecurity 
Experience Score (FIES) the section highlights the 
proportions of households in low, medium and high 
food insecurity. Section Six presents the findings of 
the study on the pandemic’s probable impact on 
household poverty using a self-assessed wellbeing. 
Section Seven provides a conclusion of the study and 
discusses policy implications. 
2. Data
2.1 Research objectives and design 
The objective of this study was to gain real-time insights 
into how the COVID-19 crisis was unfolding in Zambia 
and how rural people and food and livelihood systems 
were responding. The study focused on documenting 
and understanding the differential impacts of the 
pandemic at the household level in terms of changes in 
participation in farming activities, availability of services 
for agricultural production, labour and employment, 
marketing and transport services, food and nutrition 
security and poverty and wellbeing. The study was 
designed to be carried out in three rounds, eight 
weeks apart in satellite small-scale farm households 
surrounding Mkushi Farm Block,1 in Mkushi District, 
Central Province, in order to get an understanding of 
changes over time in these variables and how rural 
households were being affected by these changes. Due 
to logistical challenges, the first set of data collection 
was missed, so only two rounds were collected, in 
October and November 2020 (Round 1, R1) and in 
February and March 2021 (Round 2, R2).
In order to get a complete account of the reality of 
small-scale farmer livelihoods under the COVID-19 
pandemic, the study employed a mixed methods 
approach in which both quantitative and qualitative 
data were collected concurrently. Quantitative data 
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were collected through a household survey using 
a structured questionnaire directed at the head of 
the household, while qualitative data was obtained 
using an open-ended interview guide directed at key 
informants at the community level. Furthermore, a 
documentary review of national status reports, articles, 
technical reports and other published materials from 
other researchers and national and international 
organisations that have been tracking the evolution 
of COVID-19 and its impact on food systems and 
livelihoods was conducted. 
2.2 Sampling strategy 
For logistical reasons, the study was conducted in sites 
where previous quantitative studies had taken place 
under Land and Agricultural Commercialisation in 
Africa (LACA) projects. Thus, satellite small-scale farm 
households in five communities (Lilanda, Kabengeshi, 
Masansa, Miloso and Nshinso) surrounding Mkushi 
Farm Block in Mkushi District were selected for 
the study. The sites were also identified as ideal to 
investigate the impact of COVID-19 on small-scale 
producers because of the successful small-scale 
agricultural commercialisation sector that had been 
developing, supported by natural agro-ecological 
endowments, well-developed rural infrastructure and 
the presence of major agri-business companies and 
financial institutions. The small-scale farmers in these 
areas benefit from linkages with commercial farmers in 
the block and currently produce a large proportion of 
the country’s vegetables, like tomatoes that are sold in 
the capital city Lusaka and Copperbelt Province, while 
others have adopted other commercial crops such as 
wheat and soya beans. 
Lists of households for each of the five selected 
communities were obtained from area-based 
agricultural extension officers. These lists served 
as sampling frames for each community. The study 
aimed to obtain a sample of at least 100 households, 
targeting 20-25 households per community with a 50% 
gender balance. During R1, a total of 115 households 
(102 male- and 13 female-headed, representing 88.7% 
and 11.3% respectively) were interviewed. In R2, a total 
of 103 households (93 male- and 10 female-headed, 
representing 90.3% and 9.7% respectively) were also 
interviewed. In both rounds, as the data suggests, the 
study did not meet the envisaged gender balance of 
households (Table 1). The sampling frames for each 
community had far less female-headed households 
compared to male-headed. Thus, efforts were made 
to interview all the female-headed households on the 
sampling frames who were reachable by telephone. 
2.3 Survey strategy
In line with COVID-19 safeguards, the quantitative 
survey was telephone-based to avoid the possibility 
of transmitting the Coronavirus. The respondents 
were contacted by phone and appointments made for 
interviews. The survey instrument was electronically-
based, with data being directly entered using a laptop, 
tablet or smartphone. Data were electronically cleaned 
to check for any wrong entries or inconsistencies 
before analysis. Analysis was carried out using STATA. 
2.4 Key informant interview strategy 
Qualitative data was important to contextualise the 
data collected in the quantitative survey. Therefore, 
in-depth interviews were conducted with at least five 
key informants purposively selected from different 
categories of local people who had insight into the 
livelihoods of small-scale farmers in the five study 
communities before and during the COVID-19 
pandemic. The key informants included two 
agricultural extension officers, a traditional leader, a 
local government official and a community leader, each 
representing one community. An open-ended interview 
guide was used to collect qualitative data from these 
informants through telephone interviews.
3. COVID-19
3.1 COVID-19 symptoms and healthcare
All survey respondents in both R1 and R2 reported 
observing COVID-19 guidelines. However, the 
Table 1: Survey sample size





R1 Male 102 88.7
Female 13 11.3
Total 115 100.0
R2 Male 93 90.3
Female 10 9.7
Total 103 100.0
Source of data: Own calculations from APRA COVID-19 Rapid Assessment Surveys
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proportion of respondents who reported having 
household members with COVID-19 symptoms 
increased from 4% to 21%; the proportion of those 
aware of anyone in the village with these symptoms 
increased from 12% to 43%. The proportion being 
aware of confirmed COVID-19 cases increased from 
49% to 83%. However, almost all households reported 
having access to health services (97% and 99% in 
R1 and R2 respectively). Our key informant data also 
agrees with the survey findings. Key informants stated 
that in the first few months following the outbreak of 
COVID-19 in Zambia, they had not heard of anyone 
within their households and villages exhibiting COVID-
19-like symptoms but had heard of unconfirmed cases 
at district level, particularly in Mkushi Town. 
3.2 COVID-19 related measures
The Government of Zambia responded to the outbreak 
of the pandemic by putting in place ‘lockdown’ 
measures to prevent its spread, as well as policy 
responses to mitigate its negative socioeconomic 
impacts. Of note is the Statutory Instrument Number 
22 of 2020: The Public Health (Infected Areas) 
(Coronavirus Disease 2019), Regulations, 2020. 
These regulations were meant to aid the enforcement 
of ‘lockdown’ measures that the government was 
expected to announce. Prior to the pronouncement 
of the first COVID-19 case in the country, learning 
institutions, including schools, colleges and universities 
were ordered to close on 17 March 2020 (GRZ, 2020). 
The first major package of COVID-19 ‘lockdown’ 
measures in Zambia were announced on 25 March 
2020, through a presidential address to the nation. 
Some of the measures announced focused largely 
on controlling international travel to prevent further 
‘importation’ of COVID-19 cases into the country. 
Thus, Zambian Missions abroad and the Department 
of Immigration were ordered to review the issuance 
of visas for people wanting to travel to Zambia, and 
at all ports of entry into the country for all travellers 
from countries affected by COVID-19. All international 
flights were to land the Kenneth Kaunda International 
Airport in the capital city Lusaka and all travellers were 
to be screened for COVID-19 at points of entry and 
those exhibiting symptoms were to be quarantined. 
Non-essential foreign travel to countries which had 
confirmed COVID-19 cases were suspended. 
Other measures announced focused on internal 
business operations that attracted gatherings and 
were likely to be Coronavirus transmission hotspots. 
These measures included the closure of gyms, bars, 
nightclubs, cinemas and casinos. Restaurants were to 
operate on a takeaway basis only. Public gatherings 
such as conferences, weddings, funerals and festivals 
were restricted to no more than 50 participants. The 
measures were to be observed for an initial 14 days 
from midnight on 26 March 2020 and were subject to 
review (GRZ, 2020). Public health guidelines (including 
wearing of face masks, frequently washing hands or 
sanitising, maintaining physical distance and avoiding 
handshakes) were issued and all public premises 
and business premises were advised to provide 
handwashing facilities or alcohol-based hand sanitisers 
at entry points. 
Some of the measures have since been relaxed 
completely while others have been restored and 
relaxed a number of times depending on the way 
the pandemic progressed. International travel, for 
example, was completely restored and all airports 
opened in June 2020. However, the more internally-
focused measures have been periodically lifted and 
restored. For instance, on 8 May 2020, the government 
eased some of the containment measures, including 
the opening of schools for students in final examination 
years and opening of restaurants and gyms, but bars 
and taverns remained closed (Haider et al., 2020). In 
the subsequent months, more restrictions were lifted, 
including partial opening of bars to the public and the 
fully opening up of schools, colleges and universities 
for face-to-face learning. 
However, with the country experiencing a third 
COVID-19 wave in May 2021, the more inward-focused 
‘lockdown’ measures were restored on 16 June 2021. All 
schools were ordered to close immediately for a period 
of 21 days while colleges and universities were to revert 
to online teaching. Conferences and workshops were 
suspended indefinitely while church gatherings were 
restricted in terms of number of services per week and 
duration. Restaurants were ordered to revert to take-
away services only, while bars, casinos and nightclubs 
were to operate from Friday to Sunday evenings, from 
6pm to 10pm. Public gatherings were also limited to 50 
people and public transport operators were ordered 
to ensure that passengers wore masks and observed 
physical distancing. As before, these measures were to 
be reviewed after 14 days.
The frequent and premature closures of schools, 
colleges and universities have, however, raised 
concerns about the potential life-long negative impact 
on learners, particularly those from low-income 
backgrounds (OCHA, 2020a). While embracing virtual 
learning modes of instruction was desirable, the country 
was ill-prepared for both learners and instructors to 
engage in technology-dependent learning platforms 
due to lack of the necessary infrastructure (ibid). The 
most vulnerable students, and those from rural areas, 
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were the most challenged in accessing and/or affording 
smart phones, tablets or laptops, as well as the cost 
of the internet. This is likely to aggravate existing 
inequalities in accessing education between urban 
and rural areas, and high-income and low-income 
groups (ibid). A further challenge to virtual learning 
has been poor internet connectivity and the frequent 
and uncoordinated electricity power cuts. Additionally, 
frequent and prolonged closure of schools is likely to 
compel children to take up more family farm-related 
work, wage work and/or home care duties that may be 
detrimental to their health (FAO, 2020).
Over and above the ‘lockdown’ measures, the 
Government of Zambia also came up with policy 
responses in support of businesses to mitigate 
the impact of the lockdown measures. Thus, the 
government constituted a multi-sectoral COVID-19 
response team and approved a COVID-19 Contingency 
and Response Plan and a budget in March 2020 
(AGRA, 2020). Related to the agricultural sector, a 
policy response package was pronounced: work to 
ensure that the country’s new agriculture investment 
plan (the National Agriculture Investment Plan (NAIP)) 
was resilient to COVID-19 and climate change shocks; 
develop a post-COVID-19 agriculture strategy to drive 
recovery and growth; provide support to ensure 
efficient supply of agro-inputs especially seeds and 
fertiliser; and re-structure the food supply chains to be 
more resilient to COVID-19 (AGRA, 2020:1-3). Analysis 
of this policy response package, however, shows that 
it was not inclusive as it lacked a specific focus on the 
small-scale farmers who were likely to be the most 
adversely affected (Nhemachena and Murwisi, 2020). 
For instance, the proposed post-COVID-19 agriculture 
strategy to drive recovery and growth, is predicated on 
‘flagship investment programmes’ (AGRA, 2020:3) that 
may have little or no connection to small-scale farmer 
needs in rural areas. Additionally, the presidential 
pronouncement, that chain stores prioritise local 
agricultural products during the pandemic period 
(ActionAid, 2020; Lwizi, 2020) in view of delays in 
import of these products from the sub-region, did 
not translated into any actionable programme for 
small-scale farmers and therefore this group of 
farmers missed this ‘golden opportunity’ to supply 
their produce, particularly the perishable vegetable 
products to the premium market.
3.3 Official regulations and controls on 
movements
During October and November 2020 (R1), community 
movements within and outside villages had reduced 
by 92% and 96% respectively. The proportion of 
respondents who reported reductions in movements 
by R2, was 88% and 92%, representing a slight 
improvement in the rate by 4 and 3 percentage points 
respectively. Those who reported restrictions in 
visitations by family members, relatives or friends were 
85% and 71% in R1 and R2 respectively, representing 
an improvement of 14 percentage points. 
Although some sources indicated that the government 
put movement restrictions in place (ActionAid, 2020; 
AGRA, 2020; Matchaya et al., 2020), an analysis of all 
COVID-19 containment measures does not show a 
single measure centred on ‘within-country’ movement 
restrictions other than cross-border movements that 
were instituted for a limited time for non-essential 
travel. The Zambian state has not issued any regulation 
that prevented people from moving within the country 
or confining people to their homes (Haider et al., 2020) 
apart from moral appeals to people to ‘stay-at-home’ to 
avoid contracting or spreading the virus. It is important 
to underline that ‘stay-at-home’ advice was a voluntary 
measure and not mandatory. Thus far, Zambia has not 
invoked any wide-ranging geographic containment in 
people’s movements or curfew as a measure to contain 
the spread of the Coronavirus. Nonetheless, Zambia 
did implement two very brief movement containments 
involving two districts during the ‘first COVID-19 
wave’. The first ‘mini-lockdown’ was in Kafue District 
bordering the capital city, Lusaka, that took place for 
just one day on 15 April 2020 to allow health authorities 
to carry out targeted testing after the district recorded 
three cases and was deemed a COVID-19 epicentre 
during the early days of the pandemic (Siame, 2020). 
A second movement containment was the brief border 
closure with Tanzania and a total lockdown of the 
border area in Nakonde from 11 May to 15 May 2020 
following the escalation of cases among truck drivers 
and the community at the border area (AGRA, 2020; 
Haider et al., 2020). 
3.4 Care responsibilities and assistance 
measures
Care responsibility increased for the sick and elderly 
(70% and 54% in R1 and R2, respectively), children 
(78% and 76%, respectively) and of other family 
members (57% and 32%, respectively). Eight-four 
per cent of respondents in R1 reported an increased 
burden of cooking, cleaning, fuel and water collection, 
while 14% reported no change in the level of effort with 
respect to these activities. The proportion in R2 was 
78% and 20% respectively, representing a decrease 
and increase in respective rates of six percentage 
points. All schools were closed in R1 but had re-
opened by R2. After schools were closed, children 
worked at home more (61% and 64% for girls and 
boys, respectively). They also did more housework 
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(76% and 68%), more farm work (41% and 64%), as 
well as some paid work away from home (5% and 7%). 
Some children were reported to be sitting idle (1 % 
boys and 13% girls). This finding supports assertions 
made by ActionAid that the emergence of COVID-19 
would increase the burden of unpaid care work at 
home for children (especially girls) who could no longer 
go to school due to school closures (ActionAid, 2020).
Respondents said that most COVID-19 assistance 
during both R1 and R2 was received from the 
government (33%, which increased by R2 by 
13 percentage points to 46%) and local village 
organisations (12%, which reduced by six percentage 
points to 6% by R2), while a smaller number received 
support from other external organisations (7%, which 
reduced to 4%), religious organisations (6%, which 
remained at 6%) and family/friends (4%, which reduced 
to 2%). This finding was corroborated by key informants 
who observed that most support to smallholders in 
the study areas was from the government and was in 
form of the more generic annual government-operated 
Farmer Inputs Support Programme (FISP) that 
provides an inputs package containing mainly maize 
seed and fertiliser. It is worth noting that, at the time of 
R2, the government had already distributed the FISP 
inputs package for the 2020/2021 farming season to 
its beneficiaries. 
Key informants observed that other organisations, 
other than the government, played a very dismal role 
as far as humanitarian or other support to small-scale 
farmers were concerned. Thus, from the evidence, it 
is clear that rural small-scale farmers did not receive 
any kind of social support to mitigate the impacts of 
COVID-19. Key informant interviews further revealed 
that apart from awareness campaigns and, in some 
cases, donating PPE by government health and 
agricultural departments, there has not been any 
tangible COVID-19 programmes provided by the 
state or non-governmental organisation (NGO) in 
support of small-scale farmers. Despite the challenges 
presented to small-scale farmers by the pandemic, the 
government and donors instead focused their efforts 
on helping urban dwellers through various economic 
stimulus packages and emergency cash assistance 
programmes, leaving out small-scale farmers (who had 
no access to the programmes) who produce over 90% 
of food in the country (FAO, 2020; OCHA, 2020a; WFP, 
2020).
4.1 Farming, labour and marketing
4.1 Farmer participation in farming and 
business activities 
Generally, households reported reductions in their 
participation in farming activities from the time COVID-19 
“In agriculture, the extension services are being 
given and the government has given us FISP. 
So they have not let go of us. Aah, these things 
have been ongoing even before corona, yes. We 
haven’t had anything specific to corona coming, 
no.”


























Source: Own calculations from APRA COVID-19 Rapid Assessment Surveys
Figure 1: Change in participation in farming 
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started to October 2020 (R1), and a further reduction 
up to March 2021 (R2) (Figure 1). The proportion 
reporting decreases in participation increased for 
household heads from 47% to 58% between R1 and 
R2, while it remained more or less the same (54% and 
53%, respectively) for their spouses. Participation in 
businesses or household enterprises were reported as 
decreasing for the households by 87% and 76% of the 
respondents in R1 and R2, and by 89% and 71% for 
their spouses respectively. It is interesting to note that 
all female-headed households in the sample reported 
a decline in business or household enterprises, but 
this proportion was about two thirds of male-headed 
households. 
4.2 Access to work and hired labour
This study sought to establish whether COVID-19 had 
negatively impacted access to work both within and 
outside their villages, and whether farmers were able to 
hire labour during the pandemic. Survey results show 
that the proportion of households that reported an 
ability to access work within the village since the onset 
of the pandemic was 50% in R1 and this had reduced 
further to 44% by April 2021 (R2). The proportion of 
households able to access work outside of their 
village was low (20%) compared to households able 
to access work within the village in R1(20 %), however, 
this proportion slightly increased to 30% in R2. This 
finding reveals that the disrupted labour supply within 
villages was driven by fear and anxiety about getting 
infected during the initial period of the pandemic, as 
well as perceived government movement restrictions. 
This is corroborated by the results from other studies. 
Nhemachena and Murwisi (2020), for example, makes 
the same finding on COVID-19’s impact on farm labour 
shortages during the harvesting of maize, soya and 
wheat in Zambia, while a study by FAO (2020) makes a 
similar finding in a study on Eastern African countries.
Ability to hire labour to continue farming activities 
also increased slightly by 4 percentage points from 
63% in R1 to 67% in R2. However, the cost of hiring 
casual labour was reported to have increased by 77% 
households in R1, which increased further to 85% in 
R2. The figures for seasonal or permanent labour were 
similar at 78% and 82% respectively. 
While key informants noted that the first wave of 
COVID-19 was characterised by low infection and death 
rates, there was a general view that fear of infection 
within the communities led to fewer households hiring 
workers during the initial phase of the pandemic. 
By R2, these fears had eased and so some farming 
households were beginning to hire workers again.
4.3 Marketing of farm produce
The ability of households to sell various commodities in 
different types of markets generally decreased due to 
the pandemic (Table 2). By R1, 82% of the respondents 
had seen a decrease in access to district or regional 
markets, together with the cross-border markets. 
The ability to sell had also reduced at local markets 
(81%), the farm-gate or own farm (78%) and national 
markets (64%). By R2, access to these markets was 
still reported to have decreased but the proportion of 
households reporting a further decrease had reduced. 
By this time, the biggest decrease was reported in 
access to national markets (down by 19 percentage 
points) followed by farm-gate or own farm and cross-
border markets (down by 14 percentage points 
respectively), local markets (down by 8 percentage 
points), and district or regional markets (down by 6 
percentage points). 
Despite the relatively high infection and death rates 
witnessed during the latter part of the COVID-19 first 
wave and the beginning of the second wave in the 
last quarter of 2020, key informants expressed a view 
that some economic activities had rebounded as 
people had been encouraged by the government to 
conduct their daily economic activities to safeguard 
livelihoods so long as they followed health guidelines 
in place. However, a lack of clarity on COVID-19 
movement restrictions resulted in inconsistences in 
“The headman here has been very active in 
ensuring that the restrictions in movements are 
enforced; local people started to chase traders 
from urban areas to avoid Coronavirus. So the 
farmers who grow tomato have stopped because 
of no market; the traders from Copperbelt 
stopped coming due to these social restrictions.” 
Local school chairman, Kabengeshi
“Most activities had stopped at first because 
people were afraid of contracting the virus. So 
few would even think of employing anyone. It 
was not clear how the virus was moving, so 
people had stopped employing. But now they 
have realised that COVID will be with us for some 
time and people are now getting back to normal 
activities. Some small-scale farmers do employ 
piece workers and the big farmers on the farm 
block also employ.” 
Agricultural camp officer, Nshinso
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interpretation and enforcement at the local level and, 
therefore, negatively affected farming activities of some 
communities and benefitted others. For instance, where 
as in Kabengeshi buyers of farm produce from the 
urban areas were reportedly prevented from coming to 
the village to buy agricultural produce, in Miloso it was 
observed that buyers from the Copperbelt towns and 
Kasumbalesa border post were making weekly trips 
to buy tomato for the Democratic Republic of Congo 
market without restrictions.
4.4 Transport, transactions and agricultural 
services
During R1, 56% of the households reported an ability 
to transport commodities to the points of sale and 
this increased to 74% in R2 (Figure 2). However, the 
cost of transport remained high as 96% and 91% of 
the respondents in R1 and R2, respectively, reported 
increasing costs. Buyers or brokers coming into the 
communities decreased but the rate decreased by 
9 percentage points between R1 and R2, from 86% 
to 77%. Key informant interviews, however, revealed 
that farmer produce such as vegetables, and grains 
such as maize and soya bean, is largely picked and 
transported to long-distance urban and cross-border 
markets by buyers or brokers who provide their own 
transportation. Regarding grains, key informants 
further noted that the government-run Food Reserve 
Agency also has depots in central places in the area 
where farmers sell most of their maize crop when the 
grain marketing season begins. 
With regards to the modes of transactions used during 
the pandemic, the survey revealed that cash was the 
most popular with 93% and 99% of the respondents 
acknowledging using cash for transactions during R1 
and R2, respectively. This was followed by the use of 
electronic transfers with 72% (R1) and 78% (R2) of the 
respondents saying they used this mode. In the cases 
of cash and electronic transfers, the survey findings 
show an increase in the use of these modes from R1 
to R2 by about 6 percentage points. According to key 
informants, using cash in transactions was by far the 
most popular mode as people were afraid of being 
swindled when transacting large amounts of money 
through mobile money.
COVID-19 has adversely affected the availability of 
services for agricultural production and their prices in 
the study areas (Figure 3). During R1 in October 2020, 
Table 2: Changes in access to markets due to COVID-19
Type of market  Change % respondents Percentage points 
changeR1 R2
Farm-gate or own 
farm
Decreased 78 64 -14
No change 8 20 12
Increased 14 17 2
In local markets Decreased 81 73 -8
No change 10 11 1
Increased 9 16 7
In district or regional 
markets
Decreased 82 77 -6
No change 10 9 -1
Increased 7 14 7
In national markets Decreased 65 46 -19
No change 12 35 23
Increased 23 19 -4
Across the border Decreased 82 68 -14
No change 13 7 -6
Increased 5 25 20
 Source of data: Own calculations from APRA COVID-19 Rapid Assessment Surveys
“…local people had started chasing tomato 
traders coming from urban markets from the 
Copperbelt over fears that they would bring 
COVID to the community; the village headman 
particularly has been very active in ensuring that 
the restrictions in movements are enforced. So, 
traders stopped coming in to purchase tomatoes 
due to these local restrictions on movements. 
This has really affected smallholder farmers who 
grow this crop with some stopping growing the 
crop altogether.”













































Source: Own calculations from APRA COVID-19 Rapid Assessment Surveys
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Figure 3: Effect of COVID-19 on agricultural production services
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respondents reported decreases in the availability 
of agricultural land to rent (50%), farm inputs (50%), 
agricultural extension services (56%), loans/credits 
(59%), contractual arrangements for cash crops (54%) 
and concessionary loans (62%). However, by the time 
of R2 in March 2021, the proportion of respondents 
reporting a decrease in the availability of these services 
had also decreased (to 31%, 42%, 38%, and 51% 
respectively) except for contractual arrangements 
for cash crops (60%) and concessionary loans (79%) 
which had seen an increase in households reporting a 
decrease. This finding is not surprising. A few months 
into the pandemic, the low number of confirmed 
cases and deaths prompted the easing of some the 
containment measures by the government that made 
it possible for people to resume some economic 
activities. Additionally, the low cases and deaths helped 
remove the initial fears by members of the public and, 
with encouragement from the government, began to 
carry out some economic activities. 
Again, Figure 3 shows that prices for farm inputs, 
tillage services, and agricultural land rental increased 
during R1 (90%, 98%, and 76% respectively). However, 
by R2 the proportion of respondents reporting a price 
increase in inputs had radically dropped (36%) while 
those reporting an increase in prices for tillage services 
and agricultural land rental had increased (94% and 
89%, respectively). The fact that fewer households 
reported increased prices of inputs by R2 is, however, 
surprising and at odds with key informant data. 
Key informants observed that small-scale farmers, 
particularly those that were not FISP beneficiaries, had 
to grapple with expensive agricultural inputs during the 
2020/2021 agricultural season. The cost of fertiliser, 
especially, was cited as having almost doubled from 
about ZK350 in the 2019/2020 farming season to 
about ZK690 during the 2020/2021 season. They 
observed that other inputs like weed killers, fungicides 
and stock-feed had taken the same trend. A general 
view throughout the interviews with key informants was 
that farming inputs were readily available but the prices 
had gone up, increasing the cost of production, thus 
affecting farmer incomes.
5. Food and nutrition security
While the availability of the different food types, apart 
from dark green vegetables, were largely reported to 
have decreased in R1, availability largely increased for 
all types except fish and seafood in R2, which remained 
more or less the same as in R1 (Table 3). This can be 
attributed to the 2020/2021 crops which were ripening 
and being harvested, as well as the easing of some 
COVID-19 restrictions which made it possible for 
economic activities to rebound and thus increase the 
supply of food items. However, food prices generally 
continued increasing (Table 4), except for vegetables. 
The reported food price increase was greatest for 
grains, and particularly maize which is Zambia’s main 
staple. Maize prices always take an upward trend a 
few months prior to the commencement of the next 
harvest season (lean period between November and 
April) as the commodity becomes scarce. 
“In terms of inputs, they were expensive at the 
time, hence, farmers were not having access 
to everything they would want… the inputs are 
very expensive and some of them cannot afford 
to buy fertilisers since some of them are not on 
the government’s FISP. For those who are in the 
FISP programme they do not have any challenge, 
their only concern is feed, weed killer that have 
become very expensive due to Coronavirus.” 
Agricultural camp officer, Nshinso
Table 3: Extent to which food availability decreased due to COVID-19
Food type % respondents 
R1 R2
Grains 42.6 35.3
White roots and tubers and plantains 50.0 34.3
Pulses, nuts and seeds 53.6 45.1
Milk and milk products 60.4 44.4
Meat and poultry 52.7 42.0
Fish and seafood 59.1 58.8
Eggs 54.8 41.4
Dark green leafy vegetables 34.8 23.2
Other vegetables 46.3 25.5
Other fruits 58.3 46.5
Processed foods (snacks, sweets, beverages) 43.4 24.2
Source of data: Own calculations from APRA COVID-19 Rapid Assessment Surveys
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That food availability increased in R2 can be confirmed 
by the proportion of respondents reporting not having 
enough food to meet family needs reducing from 58% 
to 42% between R1 and R2. Furthermore, dividing FIES 
into three equal groups of 0-2 (low food insecurity), 3-5 
(medium food insecurity) and 6-8 (high food insecurity) 
shows that while about half of the households in R1 fell 
into the high food insecurity status, only 37% did so in 
R2 (Figure 4). The proportion of households falling in 
the medium food insecurity group remained almost the 
same, while those in the low food insecurity category 
increased by 11 percentage points from 17% to 28%. 
The survey results on food availability notwithstanding, 
key informant interview data indicated that small-scale 
farmers in the study areas were food secure in as far as 
the main staple food crop is concerned, as most grew 
their own maize crops, but that prices for purchased 
food items such as sugar and cooking oil had kept 
on increasing. For example, before the pandemic, 2.5 
litres of cooking oil was reported to have costed around 
ZK60 but this had increased to over ZK100 by R2 in 
March 2021. With inflation at around 22%, a weakening 
Table 4: Extent to which food prices increased due to COVID-19
Food type % respondents 
R1 R2
Grains 82.6 98.0
White roots and tubers and plantains 80.9 92.2
Pulses, nuts and seeds 86.4 92.2
Milk and milk products 91.9 96.0
Meat and poultry 92.0 92.0
Fish and seafood 96.5 100.0
Eggs 90.4 98.0
Dark green leafy vegetables 75.7 77.8
Other vegetables 75.9 75.5
Other fruits 88.7 82.2
Processed foods (snacks, sweets, bever-
ages)
89.5 99.0






















Source: Own calculations from APRA COVID-19 Rapid Assessment Surveys
Figure 4: Food insecurity status by survey round
“Now people have food; they grow their own 
grains like maize, the main food crop. When 
Coronavirus started… some had difficulties to 
access food especially those who buy mealie 
meal [maize meal]. But now most farmers 
have food. They have cultivated this season 
[2020/2021] and we had good rains also. In the 
next few months people will be harvesting their 
crops; they won’t starve…”
Village headman, Lilanda
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currency and rising prices for purchased food items, it 
is reasonable to suggest that several households were 
experiencing food and nutrition insecurity.2
6. Poverty
More than three quarters of the respondents in both 
survey rounds (83% and 85%, respectively) reported 
that the overall cost of living had increased. During 
the surveys, the respondents were asked to imagine 
2  A moving average (also called a rolling average) is an average based on subsets of data at given intervals. Calculating an aver-
age at specific intervals smooths out the data by reducing the impact of random fluctuations. This makes it easier to see overall 
trends, especially in a chart. For example (as in the chart) if the period value is 2, the first two values are averaged, that value is 
the first point on the line, and then the second and third values are averaged and that becomes the second point.
a nine-step ladder, where the 1st step are those who 
are totally unable to change their lives, while on step 
nine stand those who have full control over their own 
lives, and were asked where they thought they stood 
on the ladder. Analysis of this data shows that a 
good proportion of households felt in control of their 
lives before the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 5). This 
reduced after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 
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Note: The dotted lines are trend lines generated using the moving average2 
Source of data: Own calculations from APRA COVID-19 Rapid Assessment Surveys
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Figure 6: Household ability to change their lives
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Dividing the ladder into three equal groups of 1-3 
(low ability), 4-6 (medium ability) and 7-9 (high ability) 
shows that prior to the pandemic, only about 10% of 
households fell into the low ability category with the 
remaining 90% falling almost equally in the medium 
and high ability categories (Figure 6). After the onset of 
the pandemic, the proportion in the low ability category 
increased to 57% and those in the high ability category 
reduced to 13% (R1). The proportion in the low ability 
category decreased to 39% while that in the medium 
and high ability category increased to 42% and 19% 
respectively by R2. 
Overall, this result indicates that COVID-19 pushed a 
significant proportion of households in the study areas 
into the low ability category of being able to take full 
control of their lives, while at the same time reducing 
the proportion people placing themselves in the high 
ability category. The medium ability category remained 
more or less stable throughout and in fact rebounded 
to the pre-pandemic levels by R2. Although there was 
a slight recovery in the high ability category during R2, 
the recovery has not brought this category back to its 
pre-pandemic levels, with it still lagging by a significant 
27 percentage points. This means that the impact 
of COVID-19 has pushed a significant proportion of 
households into poverty in the short to medium term, 
and it is likely that it will take households a longer time 
to recover. 
7. Conclusions
The objective of this study was to gain real-time insights 
into how the COVID-19 crisis was unfolding in Zambia 
and how rural people and food and livelihood systems 
were responding. The study focused on documenting 
and understanding the impacts of the pandemic at the 
household level in terms of changes in participation in 
farming activities, availability of services for agricultural 
production, labour and employment, marketing and 
transport services, food and nutrition security and 
poverty and wellbeing.  The study was conducted with 
emergent small-scale farmers in five rural communities 
around the Mkushi Farm Block in Mkushi District, in 
central Zambia.
Overall, the study results show that COVID-19 has had 
negative impacts on small-scale farmer agricultural 
production and livelihoods in the short to medium 
term. Largely, the impacts have manifested themselves 
through disruptions to farming activities and services, 
labour supply, market access and spikes in prices for 
farm inputs, tillage services, and agricultural land rental 
and labour. These disruptions were driven largely by 
fears among communities against infection during the 
initial period of the pandemic, as well as the perceived 
movement restrictions by state authorities. 
Temporary closure of borders with Tanzania in Nakonde 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Kasumbalesa, 
and perceived movement restrictions within the 
country, disrupted lucrative long-distant markets for 
smallholder farmers and the operations of buyers or 
brokers who came to villages to buy farm produce. 
Lack of clarity on COVID-19 social restrictions, such as 
the ‘stay-at-home’ advice, resulted in inconsistences 
in interpretation and enforcement at local levels, and 
negatively affected market access for farm produce 
by some rural farming households, creating winners 
and losers amongst farming communities. Meanwhile, 
the local market offered low prices for farm produce 
while prices for farming inputs escalated. Therefore, 
low incomes from farm produce and higher prices 
for inputs and higher labour costs increased the cost 
of production and reduced the purchasing power of 
many rural households that ultimately compromised 
their livelihoods and pushed a significant proportion of 
households into poverty. 
Over and above farming activities, the pandemic 
disrupted non-farm business activities from which 
some small-scale farmer households derive part of their 
livelihoods. At the same time, emergency support from 
family and friends, local religious organisations, local 
village organisations and other external organisations 
remained insignificant throughout the study period, 
meaning that rural households had nowhere to seek 
support. Government and donor agencies focused 
their efforts on helping urban dwellers through various 
economic stimulus packages and emergency cash 
assistance programmes, leaving out small-scale 
farmers who had no access to these programmes.
While some households reported improvements on a 
number of variables months after reporting negative 
“Because of the fear of COVID, most farmers 
are selling just locally so it’s not good because 
prices [of farm produce] are really low…while 
inputs are expensive. Before COVID, farmers 
took their products straight from the farm direct 
to the border but this time they were restricted 
at the border, especially Kasumbalesa, where 
farmers sell most of their tomatoes, hence selling 
their products locally. So, farmers’ income has 
reduced, and so is their ability to buy enough of 
the food stuffs they need from the shops.”
Agricultural camp officer, Nshinso
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change, analysis shows that the recovery has not 
brought these households back to their pre-COVID-19 
pandemic positions. From this evidence, we can 
speculate that recovery from the impact of COVID-19 
and the government-imposed ‘lockdown’ measures 
is likely to take rural small-scale households a longer 
timeframe to recover from. However, the COVID-19 
pandemic is evolving, and little is still known about its 
future trajectory, particularly in sub-Saharan African 
countries like Zambia. 
Data suggests that small-scale farmers are crucial to 
food security in Zambia as they produce about 90% 
of food in the country (WFP, 2020). Yet small-scale 
farmers have the least capacity to mitigate shocks 
such as COVID-19. There is, therefore, a clear case 
for support to the smallholder sector to mitigate the 
impacts of COVID-19 on agricultural activities and 
services and make small-scale farmer livelihoods 
more resilient. In the short to medium term, the 
government and cooperating partners should devise 
social protection interventions that are inclusive of 
small-scale farmers and rural agricultural workers 
that have been negatively affected by COVID-19. 
These interventions can be adapted from the existing 
social cash transfer programmes but should focus on 
enhancing the livelihood assets of small-scale farmers 
and agricultural services to boost the purchasing 
power of rural households. 
The proposed post-COVID-19 agricultural strategy to 
drive recovery and growth in the agricultural sector 
should be inclusive of the needs of small-scale farmers 
in rural areas, and be informed by the new challenges 
faced by small-scale farmers in the face of the pandemic 
such as market access and linkages. The study has 
established that one of the biggest challenges to 
small-scale farmer participation in agricultural activities 
during the pandemic is the perception that there 
was ‘movement restrictions’ put in place by state 
authorities. The government and other stakeholders 
should, therefore, clarify the ‘lockdown’ measures or 
‘social restrictions’ such as ‘movement restriction’ 
and/or ‘stay-at-home’ advice for uniform application 
or enforcement, particularly in rural areas populated 
by a semi-illiterate population. Lastly, there is need for 
more in-depth studies that would look at a longer-time 
horizon to get a better picture of the COVID-19 impacts 
on food systems and rural livelihoods than the current 
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